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Abstract
The world is rapidly adopting RESTful web services for most of its tasks. The once popular SOAP-based web services are fast losing
ground owing to this. RESTful web services are light weight services without strict message formats. RESTful web services, unlike
SOAP, are capable of message transfer in any format be it XML, JSON, plain-text. However, in spite of these positives, ensuring
message level security in REST is a challenge. Security in RESTful web services is still largely dependent upon transport layer
security. There has been some work recently towards message level security in such environments wherein the transfer of message
level security metadata is done through utilising new HTTP headers. We feel, however, that any method that compromises the
generality of the HTTP protocol should be avoided. In this paper, therefore, we propose two new ways of encryption that promise
to ensure message level security in RESTful web services without the need for special HTTP headers. This approach works
seamlessly on most famous content-types of RESTful web services: XML, JSON, HTML, plain-text and various ASCII printable
content types. Further, the proposed approach removes the need for content negotiation in cases where the content comprises XML,
JSON, HTML, plain-text, and ASCII printable content types and also removes the need for XML or JSON canonicalization.
Keywords: RESTful Web Services, Message level Security
1. Introduction
Web services are a means to access the web in a ‘program-
matic’ manner. A website and a web service are similar in that
both respond to requests made by clients on the web. Web-
sites respond with content that can easily be comprehended by
a human eg. HTML, CSS and Javascript, whereas web services
respond with content meant for consumption by other applica-
tions eg. XML, JSON. The response from web services has a
greater focus on data whereas that from websites is more to-
wards an interactive representation of data.
Web services may be categorised into two broad types:
SOAP-based web services and RESTful web services. SOAP-
based web services deal with properly structured messages
comprising formal XML-based formats for a request and re-
sponse. RESTful web services, on the other hand, lack such
formal formats. This contributes to the flexibility and ‘light
weight’ nature of RESTful web services. SOAP request and
response messages usually utilise HTTP or SMTP packets as
containers, whereas REST requests comprise a simple HTTP
request with the use of the common HTTP verbs CRUD (cre-
ate, read, update and delete) for executing operations on the
resource [1]. The response from a RESTful web service to a re-
quest is also an HTTP response containing XML, JSON, CSV,
HTML, or plain-text.
In REST, any content or service on the web for which a client
makes a request to a server is known as a ‘resource’. A resource
is content available with the server side and may get transferred
or even modified based on a client’s request. A resource may
be a text or a binary file or may be data stored in a database.
Each resource is identified by a unique ID called the Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI). A resource may be represented in
various formats such as XML, JSON, CVS, HTML, plain-text
and others with the most popular representation today being
XML and JSON.
RESTful web services, unlike SOAP, do not have a
formal description language, therefore, it is common for
services to publish their resource representations on public
domains like websites. For example, Google publishes the
resource representation of its drive API at the following URL
https://developers.google.com/drive/v3/reference/about# re-
source. In addition to this, web service providers also describe
the capabilities of the various HTTP verbs for performing
operations on a given resource in a similar manner.
An important requirement for web services while connecting
with their clients is a robust security mechanism. This is along
lines similar to ordinary websites. Security is imperative for
the following three purposes: confidentiality, integrity and au-
thenticity. Confidentiality implies that a conversation between
the server and the client makes no sense to a potential intruder
eavesdropping on the conversation. Confidentiality can be pro-
vided by encryption of the message. Integrity implies that a
message in transit between a client and a server must remain
unchanged during transit. Authenticity ensures that a client and
server talking to each other are indeed talking to each other and
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not a third entity. Digital signature provides integrity and au-
thenticity.
Web services and websites both work at the application layer.
To use a website or web service a client first needs to con-
nect with the server providing the service at the transport layer.
This type of connection is called a TCP (Transmission Control
Protocol) connection. TCP contains and carries the application
layer data in the form of HTTP or SMTP inside it. There are
quite a few Security mechanisms available at the transport layer
that are quite robust and provide encryption, authentication and
authorization. One such mechanism is Transport Layer Secu-
rity (TLS) [2].
TLS makes use of two types of encryption algorithms: sym-
metric key encryption and asymmetric key encryption algo-
rithms. In asymmetric key encryption, the server maintains
two keys of which one is ‘public’ and the other ‘private’. The
server makes the public key available to all, and the private key
is kept hidden. A message that is encrypted using the public
key can only be decrypted using the private key. The client
encrypts the message using this public key and sends it to the
server. The server subsequently decrypts the message using the
secret private key. In symmetric key encryption, both the server
and client maintain a shared secret key between them called the
symmetric session key. The symmetric session key is used both
for encryption and decryption. To send a message, the client en-
crypts the message with this key and upon reaching the server,
the same key is used for decryption.
To transfer a large amount of data symmetric key algorithms
are efficient as these are relatively light weight. To transfer
fewer data asymmetric key algorithms are deemed more appro-
priate. The big question with symmetric key encryption is: how
to transfer the symmetric key initially from the client to server
over a non-secure channel? A server provides its public key to
all its clients. A client that wants to connect to the server pro-
vides the symmetric shared key information encrypted with the
server’s public key to the server. The server sees this shared key
information after decrypting the client’s message using the pri-
vate key. After the server’s agreement on the shared key both
start to transfer their data encrypted by the shared symmetric
key. This is the normal sequence followed in encryption: first,
the asymmetric key encryption, as described earlier, is used
only to securely get the symmetric key for a session. Subse-
quent to this, in all further communications in that session be-
tween client and server symmetric key encryption is used.
Transport Layer Security (TLS), as described above, is nor-
mally used to encrypt the TCP container that contains the HTTP
or SMTP container (application layer data) of the web service
request and response. We know that both SOAP and REST-
ful web services contain XML, JSON etc inside the application
layer packet (HTTP or SMTP), which is contained in the trans-
port layer packet (TCP). TLS is effective with web services if
the transfer of messages is between two parties only. In scenar-
ios where several intermediate nodes need to access different
parts of the content of the same HTTP or SMTP container, how-
ever, TLS becomes ineffective and the need arises for a message
level security mechanism at the application layer [3]. This is
a typical requirement of a web service composition scenario,
where several nodes interact with each other to provide a larger
composite application.
For better comprehension of the scenario, let us consider a
simple real world example of a big box containing a small box
inside which there are several tennis balls with some relevant
information written on them. Each ball belongs to a different
person. The big box here can be looked upon as the HTTP
container, the small box represents the entire XML or JSON
message, and the balls represents various tags in XML or fields
in JSON. The message written on one ball should be such that
it cannot be understood by a person to whom it does not belong.
What TLS does is: it encrypts the big box (Fig. 1.). When a
person decrypts this big box, the small box and the informa-
tion written on all the balls inside the small box become visible
to that person irrespective of whether the ball belongs to him
or not. Message level security, on the other hand, encrypts the
information written on each ball and therefore only the person
to whom a ball belongs is given the rights to decrypt the mes-
sage. The balls here are the different tags of XML (or fields
in JSON) that may be intended for different intermediate web
service nodes in a web-service composition scenario. The en-
tire XML should be encrypted so that the intermediate nodes
are only able to understand and/or edit tags that are meant for
them. The need, therefore, is to encrypt the message written on
each tag separately with different keys (Fig. 2.). Encrypting the
various parts of an XML or JSON document with different keys
is known as message level encryption. Message level encryp-
tion has the potential to provide message level security to web
services.
Figure 1: Encryption by TLS
Figure 2: Message Level Encryption
SOAP based services do have formal mechanisms for mes-
sage level security defined by W3C and OASIS [3] which pro-
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vide authentication, authorization and encryption. These ser-
vices are broadly based on XML Signature [4] and XML En-
cryption [5]. XML signature and XML encryption may work
on the whole document, a part of the document, or even on bi-
nary documents. After encryption and signature, however, the
encrypted document gets represented as XML only.
XML encryption uses existing block or stream ciphers to en-
crypt the document. Some of these algorithms are Advanced
Encryption Algorithm (AES) [6], Data Encryption Algorithm
[7] etc. Both XML encryption and signature use different ver-
sions of the Standard Hash Algorithm [8] for creating the mes-
sage digest. For key agreement they use the Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [9] Key Agreement. All these encryp-
tion and hash algorithms work on the data at the byte level.
The issue with byte level encryption and signature is that two
XML documents that represent the same data may not be iden-
tical byte-by-byte and as such even a slight cosmetic difference
between the documents changes the whole encryption or sig-
nature. An example of this is: interchanging the position of
attributes in a tag does not change the nature of the XML docu-
ment, however, it completely changes the encryption and signa-
ture of that document. The normal procedure to overcome this
problem is through XML cannonicalization [10]. Here, several
strict rules need to be applied on the XML documents such that
two XML documents that represent the same data become iden-
tical down to the last byte. Effective implementation of XML
based signature and encryption requires the compulsory step of
XML canonicalization.
This technique is ineffective if the two parties in conversation
support different technologies, e.g. one supports XML content
and the other supports JSON. Also, XML canonicalization is
a compulsory step in XML based security and it is a cumber-
some process indeed. All this contributes to making such secu-
rity techniques unsuitable for RESTful web services. Currently,
there is no formal model for the provision of message level se-
curity in RESTful web services. In RESTful web services, both
message encryption and authentic connection are still majorly
dependent upon Transport Layer Security (TLS).
Web service composition is a typical example where inter-
mediate nodes need to access the same RESTful message and
where TLS is not effective. In web service composition sev-
eral service providers work together to form a large composite
service offering. Each web service in a service composition
does its bit and the larger composite task gets done. We are
also moving towards a scenario where individual web services
dynamically partake in a composition and after providing their
respective services exit with the group. To realise such a sce-
nario in a secure environment, it is imperative that an effective
message level security mechanism be in place that would en-
able a web service only partial access to a message and keep
the rest of it hidden.
We need to keep the various REST principles in mind while
designing message level security models for RESTful services.
In recent work by Gabriel Serme et. al [11] use of HTTP head-
ers is made to transfer names of encryption algorithms, keys
and other security meta data. Encryption and signature in this
approach are done through the use of existing algorithms. We
feel that sending new headers in HTTP packet makes the HTTP
protocol itself non general. Further, use of existing encryption
algorithms results in large sized HTTP contents.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to encrypting
RESTful web services at the message level that works well si-
multaneously with most popular content types (XML, JSON,
HTML and plain-text). The main idea in this approach is to re-
place the ASCII printable characters with a series of numbers
during encryption and doing the reverse during decryption. En-
cryption and decryption through this simple approach become
easy and effective. This is because the encrypted message is
quite small in size as compared to that of existing algorithms.
In fact, in certain situations, the encrypted message is smaller
than the message itself. The character to number conversion
proposed also removes the need for XML cannonicalization be-
cause it is not a byte-by-byte encryption.
The proposed approach also eliminates the need for content
negotiation wherein the client and server negotiate on the type
of content (XML, JSON) to be used for communication. This
is because a resource gets converted into the same encryption
irrespective of the type of representation. The series of num-
bers that constitutes the encryption will always be placed in the
HTTP body as text/plain content type. The approach does not
require special HTTP headers to pass security meta-data nor
does it violate REST principles.
Resource Representation is all about one to one mapping of
XML tag-name and data type supported inside that tag, or data
type supported by the value of the JSON name. Several web
service providers represent their resources in their API docu-
mentation. In the proposed approach the server does not need
to publish its resource representation. This is because all rep-
resentations (XML, JSON etc.) get converted to the same en-
cryption and can be decrypted to any representation. Data types
in between the tags and JSON names are specified explicitly in
the encryption itself. The client comes to know about resource
representation in the encrypted form after its first request for
the resource.
It should be noted that in this paper we do not intend to pro-
vide a complete security solution for web service composition
scenario. The idea is to introduce a novel, and much simpler
technique for encryption that is also secure, reliable, fast, and
results in much smaller sized encrypted messages. The tech-
nique also removes the need for XML canonicalization and con-
tent negotiation.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we discuss
the system architecture for our approach. In Section 3 we de-
scribe our proposed approach in detail with a running example
for better understanding. We discuss various advantages of our
approach in Section 4 and conclude the paper in Section 5.
2. System Architecture
In RESTful communications and in general XML-tags,
XML-attributes, values of XML-attributes and JSON-names
change less frequently and therefore we call these the non-
variable parts of the request and response messages. The values
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in between XML-tags or the values of JSON names on the other
hand change much more frequently and we call these the vari-
able parts of request and response messages. For example:
XML 1:
<root attr1="value1" attr2="value2">
<name>iiti</name>
<value>2</value>
</root>
JSON 1:
"root": {
"-attr1": "value1",
"-attr2": "value2",
"name": "iiti",
"value": "2"
}
XML and JSON can be easily converted into each other. An
XML and its corresponding JSON are shown above as XML 1
and JSON 1. In XML 1 the “root”, “name”, “value”, “attr1”,
“attr2”, “value1” and “value2” are the non-variable parts and
“iiti” and “2” are the variable parts of the message. In the corre-
sponding JSON message JSON 1, we have similar non-variable
and variable parts.
In our approach of encryption both the non-variable and
variable parts of the message are represented by a string of
numbers. The encrypted message is sent to the receiver en-
capsulated within an HTTP packet as plain-text. We know
that XML and JSON can be easily converted to each other and
as stated earlier the strength of this algorithm is that it does
not matter whether the content to be encrypted is in JSON or
XML the result is the same encrypted message which can sub-
sequently be decrypted into JSON and/or XML as the need be.
Encryption and decryption can be done by a shared symmetric
key among parties. In case of web service composition where
different intermediaries have access to the same RESTful mes-
sage, different parts of the same message can be encrypted with
different symmetric keys. We initially discuss message level
encryption between two parties only. Subsequently, in Section
3 we escalate the discussion to multiple party web-service com-
position.
Figure 3 shows the various components at the client and
server ends that are used for encryption/decryption. At the
server side, there is a message level encryption/decryption
module (Encryption-Decryption Engine) that lies between the
RESTful service application and the HTTP service. At the
client side, the same lies between the RESTful client and the
HTTP client. There is a ‘Key Manager’ at both ends that is
connected to the corresponding HTTP server and client.
2.1. Key Manager
Prior to the start of a conversation, both ends require a sym-
metric session key. The key manager at both ends manages the
symmetric key. First, the client’s key manager sends a key re-
quest to the server’s key manager as a special command (“Get
Figure 3: Cliet Server Interaction
key”). The “Get key” command goes to the HTTP client sec-
tion at the client side. The HTTP client section at the client
side places the “Get key” command in the body of the HTTP
POST request with the content type being plain-text as shown
in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Client’s request for key
The HTTP service at the server side receives the request and
finds the “Get key” string in the POST request’s body. Subse-
quently, the server’s key manager generates 10 random integers
within a given range and creates a unique 10 element key. The
server’s key manager passes this 10 element key to the HTTP
service at the server side. The HTTP service at the server side
creates an HTTP response, places the key in the response body
with the content type being plain text and sends the HTTP re-
sponse to the HTTP client at the client side (Fig. 5). The HTTP
client at the client side reads the response body and passes the
content to the client’s key manager.
The conversation between the client and the server for a key
is a matter between just two parties and therefore the key ex-
change can utilise TLS for security. Both sides store the shared
key in a key database for further use. The number of keys main-
tained by each member in a web services composition group
depends on the structure of the web services composition. At
most, each member in a group of n service providers may need
4
Figure 5: Server’s response with key
to maintain n secret keys (n-1 keys to communicate with the
other n-1 members and one group key). The shared key gets
stored in key-databases of the client and the server. The client
is responsible for a change in key. To change the key the client
sends a new key request to the server.
2.2. 10 Element Key
This symmetric key is at the heart of the proposed approach
and comprises 10 elements. Using just this key both the client
and server can create various tables that take part in message
level encryption and decryption. We have seen an example of
the 10 element key randomly generated by the server in Figure
5 ([12,6,1,1,1,14,4,0,3,2]). In general, the key is represented
as key = [rows, cols, start with, row rev, col rev, symbol type,
group size, reverse, final sum, power]. In this paper different
elements of the key are referred to by using indexing starting
from 0, for example key[0] for rows, key[1] for cols etc. We
will now understand the various elements of the key one by
one.
2.2.1. rows (key[0])
The Encryption-Decryption engine at both the client and
server sides maintains a table that we choose to call the Tem-
porary Table (TT). rows at key[0] specifies the number of rows
in this table. The number of rows in TT = key[0] + 1. key[0]
ranges from 1 to any integer depending upon the capability of
the system.
2.2.2. cols (key[1])
cols at key[1] specifies the number of columns in the TT.
The number of columns in TT = key[1] + 1. For key =
[12,6,1,1,1,14,4,0,3,2] the TT at both the client and server
sides will have 13 rows and 7 columns (including the coloured
‘header’ rows and columns) as shown in Figure 6. The coloured
cells of the table are used to store table headers, whereas the
white cells are for normal entries. key[1] ranges from 1 to any
integer depending upon the capability of the system.
2.2.3. start with (key[2])
We have two types of headers in TT, one is a row header (rh)
and the other is the column header (ch). As part of the encryp-
tion process, we need to number both rh and ch. Numbering
always starts with 1. Numbering can start from either rh or ch
depending upon the value of key[2]. The header numbering of
Figure 6: Temporary Table (TT)
TT starts with rh if the value of key[2] is 0 and it starts with ch if
the value of key[2] is 1. Range of key[2] is {0, 1}. If the number-
ing of the header starts with numbering rh, then the same count
continues while numbering ch and vice-versa. For example, in
key = [12,6,1,1,1,14,4,0,3,2] the header numbering starts with
ch. In Figure 6, therefore, the count 1 to 6 has been used for
numbering ch and in continuation with that 7 to 18 have been
used for numbering rh.
2.2.4. row rev (key[3])
If key[3] is 0 then the rh numbering starts from the top most
row (top to bottom) and if key[3] is 1 then the rh number-
ing starts from the bottom row (bottom to top). For key =
[12,6,1,1,1,14,4,0,3,2] the rh numbering starts from the bottom
and progresses towards the top as shown in Figure 6. The range
of key[3] is {0, 1}.
2.2.5. col rev (key[4])
If key[4] is 0 then the ch numbering starts from the left most
column (left to right) and if key[4] is 1 then the ch number-
ing starts from the right most column (right to left). For key =
[12,6,1,1,1,14,4,0,3,2], the ch numbering starts from the right
and progresses towards the left as shown in Figure 6. The range
of key[4] is {0, 1}.
2.2.6. symbol type (key[5])
There are four types of characters that can be used in this
table as elements in the non-header cells: small alphabet, cap-
ital alphabet, digits, and special symbols. The total possible
arrangements in this table are: 4C1 × (1!) +4 C2 × (2!) +
4C3 × (3!) +4 C4 × (4!) = 64. For all these 64 arrangements
key[5] ranges from 0 to 63. Each value defines a unique occur-
rence, non occurrence, and order of occurrence of the various
printable ASCII characters in the non header cells of the TT.
For each value of key[5], the entry of characters in TT starts
from the top left corner non-header cell and sequentially moves
towards the bottom right corner non-header cell. For example,
1) If value key[5] is 0 then only small alphabet characters are
allowed in TT, 2) If it is 1 then only capital alphabet characters
are allowed in TT. Similarly, if key[5] is 14 then the order of
entering characters in TT is digits, followed by capital alpha-
bets, further followed by small alphabets. The value 14 ignores
special symbols. There are various other arrangements of char-
acters for other values of key[5]. Another value of key[5] may
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have included special symbols and the various characters may
have been in a different order of occurrence. Figure 6 shows
the entry of TT if key = [12,6,1,1,1,14,4,0,3,2]. key[5] and the
corresponding arrangement of characters are only assumptions
of the authors. During implementation, these may be different,
but the total possible combination is always fixed.
2.2.7. group size (key[6])
Various groups of consecutive elements in TT are created.
Each group has a size indicated by key[6]. The last group
of TT can have fewer elements than key[6]. For key =
[12,6,1,1,1,14,4,0,3,2] since key[6] is 4, TT has various groups
of 4 elements each. In Figure 6 we represent the various groups
as alternately underlined and non-underlined elements. The el-
ements 0,1,2,3 are in the same group and 4,5,6,7 are in a differ-
ent group, similarly elements 8, 9, A, B are in the same group
and C, D, E, F are in a different group, and so on. key[6] ranges
from 1 to (key[0]-1) × (key[1]-1).
2.2.8. reverse (key[7])
If key[7] is 1 then the elements in all the groups will be in a
group wise reverse order with respect to their initial positions
in the group. If this value is 0 then no such reverse operation
occurs. For key = [12,6,1,1,1,14,4,0,3,2], the TT is shown in
Figure 6. For key = [12,6,1,1,1,14,4,1,3,2] the groups get re-
versed and the corresponding TT is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Temporary Table (TT)
2.2.9. final sum (key[8])
key[8] will be explained later.
2.2.10. power (key[9])
In the process of message level encryption, we need to cal-
culate a unique integer corresponding to each character present
in TT. This integer may be calculated as (rh)key[9] + (ch)key[9].
For example, for the following key = [12,6,1,1,1,14,4,1,3,2] the
integer value of G is (15)2 + (5)2 = 250, similarly the integer
value for 9 is (17)2 + (2)2 = 293, and so on. It is possible that
two different characters may end up in the same integer, this
situation is called integer collision. If integer collision occurs
then we keep on increasing the integer value of the later charac-
ters in TT until it gets a unique value. Powering ch and rh with
key[9] has two benefits. 1). It makes the encryption itself more
random and 2). The Probability of integer collision becomes
very less. Range of key[9] from 1 to any integer depends on the
capabilities of the service provider and consumer.
It is important to note that the rules outlined for the Tag Table
are for demonstrating the idea and are open to modification.
The main idea is to bring in as much randomness as possible so
as to make it impossible for an adversary to guess the contents.
2.3. Encryption and Decryption engines
A client’s PUT or POST request that may be in XML, JSON
or plain text is first sent to the Encryption-Decryption engine. In
the Encryption-Decryption engine at the client side, the request
message gets converted into a string of numbers. Subsequent
to this, the HTTP/S client encapsulates this string of numbers
within an HTTP/S request (PUT or POST) packet and sends it
to the server. At the server end, the HTTP/S server reads the
string of numbers and sends it to the Encryption-Decryption
engine at the server end. The Encryption-Decryption engine
at this end decrypts the string of numbers into the correspond-
ing XML and/or JSON form and finally delivers it to the Web
service. The same process repeats with the response from the
server to the client. The Encryption and decryption engines
used here comprise the following sub-components:
2.3.1. Temporary Table (TT)
Temporary Tables (TT) have been discussed at length in the
earlier sub-sections. We assume that the contents of this table
comprise only printable ASCII characters. Each element in the
table, comprising printable ASCII characters, is uniquely de-
fined by a corresponding pair of rh and ch. The Structure of
the table and the position of various characters in the cells is
established by the parties in conversation using the symmetric
key as discussed earlier. The TT is deleted after the creation of
the symbol table.
2.3.2. Symbol Table (ST)
This comprises a table with two columns without a row or
column header. The table maps each printable ASCII character
to a unique integer derived from TT using the symmetric key.
The table is mainly used for special encryption and decryption
of ASCII printable RESTful content called symbol table based
encryption (STBE) and symbol table based decryption (STBD).
The Creation of ST, its purpose, and the various steps of STBE
and STBD are covered in the next section.
2.3.3. Tag Table (TAT)
This component includes a table with two columns without
a row or column header. The table maps the non-variable parts
of a RESTful message (XML, JSON or HTML) to a unique
integer. The table is used for another encryption and decryption
on ASCII printable RESTful contents called tag table based
encryption (TATBE) and tag table based decryption (TATBD).
The creation of TAT, its purpose and the various steps involved
in TATBE and TATBD are covered in the next section.
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3. The Approach
Before further discussion we assume that the 10 element key
(key = [12,6,1,1,1,14,4,1,3,2]) has already been exchanged be-
tween the two parties and TT has been created at both ends. In
the following subsections, the remaining encryption procedure
is discussed based on the 10-element key and the TT created
based on this key (Fig. 7). We will be using a running example
for better understanding of the approach. Figure 8 summarises
our approach. The figure describes both encryption and decryp-
tion.
Figure 8: Flow Chart of our Approach
Our purpose is to provide a substitution cipher which con-
verts the plain-text into a series of numbers. Such substitution
cipher removes the need of XML canonicalization. As shown
in Figure 8, after the creation of TT, the Symbol Table (ST)
gets created as shown in Figure 9. Refer to the various variable
and non-variable parts of both encrypted and plain messages as
words. The symbol table maps each character in a non-header
cell of the TT to a unique integer. We use this table to replace
each character in the XML or JSON documents to a correspond-
ing unique integer. For example, the word “iiti” gets converted
into “122122104122”. This is called ST Based Encryption i.e
STBE. Decrypting “122122104122” back into “iiti” is called
ST based decryption (STBD). The process of ST creation, STBE
and STBD are discussed in the following sub-sections. Since
the ST can be created based on the 10-element key, both parties
can start encryption and decryption using ST without knowing
the structure of the message. Using STBE results in a large size
encrypted message because each character either in the variable
or non-variable parts gets converted to a unique integer. This is
why we introduced the concept of Tag Table (TAT). The TAT
maps the whole variable parts of the message to a unique inte-
ger (Fig. 10). Using the Tag Table Based Encryption (TATBE)
results in an encrypted message size that is smaller than the
STBE. For example, the tag “root” can be converted into “04”
using the TATBE instead of “0117126126104” using the STBE.
Decrypting “04” back in “root” is called the Tag Table Based
Decryption (TATBD). The process of the TAT creation, TATBE
and TATBD are discussed in the following subsections. The
idea is to use the STBE and STBD for variable parts and for
those non-variable parts of the message whose TAT entries still
do not exists on either side. When the STBE and STBD are be-
ing used for the non-variable parts, the Tag Table (TAT) entry
for the same must be created for later use. Use TATBE for those
variable parts whose entries are present in the TAT at both sides.
3.1. Symbol Table Creation
The Symbol Table (ST) gets created by the client and server
based on the Temporary Table (TT) in the following manner:
The ch and rh of all non-header characters inside the TT are
identified and the corresponding unique number for each non-
header symbol in the same is calculated. The procedure for
creating ST is shown below:
1. For each non-header and non-empty cell in TT, the print-
able character is taken out and its corresponding unique
integer value is calculated as value = (rh)key[9]+(ch)key[9].
For example TT in Fig. 7, character ‘j’ has rh = 11 and ch
= 2. The calculated value = (11)2+(2)2. So value corre-
sponding to ‘j’ in TT is 125.
2. The number of digits in value is made the same as the value
of key[8]. In doing this, we first calculate diff = key[8]-
(no. of digits in value) and then proceed to step 3.
For example if key = [12,6,1,1,1,14,4,1,3,2] (key[8] is 3)
then diff = 3-3 = 0.
3. We calculate the final value that is to be inserted in ST cor-
responding to the given non-header character of TT. We
do it as final value = value×10di f f .
For example final value of ‘j’ is 125×100 = 125 .
4. The final record to be inserted in ST is the (character, fi-
nal value) pair. The final value is the primary key of ST.
If a record in ST exists with the same final value then go
to step 5 otherwise, go to step 6 .
For example (‘j’,125) is going to be inserted in ST. Before
insertion of this record, we first check if a record in ST ex-
ists with the same final value (125). For now, we assume
that no such record exists, and therefore go to step 6. If
(‘j’,125) is already in ST and (‘o’,125) has to be inserted
we go to step 5.
5. When a record with the same final value already exists in
ST, the final value of the record is incremented by 1 and
checked for uniqueness. This is continued until a unique fi-
nal value is found. Subsequently, step 6 is executed. Note
that even if we considered final value as a primary key
more than one entry of a character is not possible, because
each character is unique in TT.
For example before inserting a record for character ‘o’, we
increase its final value to 126. If a record with final value
126 also exists then we make it (‘o’,127), otherwise, we
record (‘o’,126) and proceed to step 6.
6. Insert the record (character, final value) in ST.
A subset of ST is shown in Fig.9.
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Figure 9: A Subset of ST
3.2. Symbol Table Based Encryption (STBE) and TAT Creation
at Server Side
By now both the client and server should have the same Tem-
porary Table (TT) and Symbol Table (ST). The client now sends
its first request to the server. The requested resource would
comprise several variable and non-variable parts (either XML
or JSON). The non-variable part could be any name and vari-
able part could be of any data-type. Until this point, the client
only knows the URI of the resource and does not know anything
about the resource representation. If the client makes an HTTP
request that does not require an HTTP body (e.g GET) then the
server responds after encrypting the response message using ST
as STBE. The client decodes this using the Symbol Table Based
Decryption (STBD). The decrypted message gets converted into
XML or JSON. In the decrypted document the name of the non-
variable parts and data type of the variable parts will be clear
to the client. We will explore STBD in a later sub-section.
If the client request requires an HTTP body (e.g PUT, POST)
and the client does not have any idea about the resource repre-
sentation in the request body (i.e what to send in the request
body) then the client will send an empty POST request on the
URI. In such a case, the server sends an encrypted resource
representation using the STBE. The STBE is used by the server
when the client is not in the know of the non-variable parts of
the message. As soon as the client becomes aware of the non-
variable parts, the server stops encrypting the message using
the STBE and starts encrypting it using the Tag Table Based
Encryption (TATBE). We will explore TATBD in a later sub-
section.
In the eventuality that the server introduces a new non-
variable part in between a conversation, the new non-variable
part is encrypted using STBE and the encryption of the rest of
the non-variable parts is done through TATBE. The variable
parts of the message always get encrypted using STBE. The
client never needs to encrypt the non-variable parts of its re-
quest body using the STBE. This is because the client can never
introduce a new non-variable part in the request. The client,
however, needs to decrypt the non-variable parts of the re-
sponse sent out by the server that is encrypted using STBE. The
process of encrypting XML1 using STBE and creation of Tag
Table (TAT) for each non-variable parts of the message happens
simultaneously at the server side is depicted in the steps below.
Lets assume that the encrypted message gets stored in a string
variable STEnc. The initial value of STEnc is null. We have two
more variables noOfNonVars and noOfDigitsForNonVars, both
are initially 0. The variable and non-variable parts of the XML
are taken in the same order that they appear in the document.
We together call these parts (the variable and non-variable parts
of the XML) a word. For example in XML1 the order of oc-
currence of the words are “root”, “attr1”, “value1”, “attr2”,
“value2”, “name”, “iiti”, “/name”, “value”, “2”, “/value”
and “/root”.
In the case of web service composition different tags may be-
long to different service providers. Different tags are therefore
encrypted using different keys. The receiver must be notified
about tag numbers which have been encrypted by its key. There
are therefore comma separated tag numbers appended at the be-
ginning of STEnc followed by space. For a tag number present
at the beginning of STEnc, the client has access to all child ele-
ments of the given tag.
For example (1,) at the beginning of STEnc says that the re-
ceiver has access to the tag “root” and its children inXML1 (i.e
whole document). If (2,) present at the beginning of STEnc says
that the receiver has access to the tag “name” and its children in
XML1. The presence of (2,3,) at the beginning of STEnc says
that the receiver has access to the tags “name” and “value” and
their children inXML1. Normally common tags like “root” get
encrypted using an agreed upon group-key among members.
If word (1,) gets added in STEnc, then STEnc which was
initially null becomes:
STEnc = “1, ”.
1. Repeat step-2 to step-7 for each word in the XML.
2. If the word is a tag then the same is converted into a string
of numbers preceded by 0 using the ST reference for each
character of the word. This string of numbers is then con-
catenated into a single string STEnc followed by a space
and step 7 is executed.
For example, the first word of XML1 is a tag “root”. This
consists of four characters ‘r’, ‘o’, ‘o’ and ‘t’. The ST en-
tries corresponding to these characters are ‘117’, ‘126’,
‘126’ and ‘104’ respectively. These numbers get con-
catenated as “0117126126104”. Therefore, the encrypted
form of the tag root along STBE is “0117126126104”.
Concatenate the encrypted form of the word in STEnc fol-
lowed by a space. If STEnc was initially “1, ” and then it
gets updated as:
STEnc = “1, 0117126126104 ”.
3. If the word is an attribute-name, the same is converted into
a string of numbers preceded by 00 using the ST reference
for each character of the word. This string of numbers is
then concatenated into STEnc followed by a space and step
7 is executed.
For example, the second word of XML1 “attr1” is an
attribute-name. This consists of five characters ‘a’, ‘t’,
‘t’, ‘r’ and ‘1’. The Symbol Table ST entries cor-
responding to these characters are ‘153’, ‘104’, ‘104’,
‘117’ and ‘340’ respectively. These numbers are con-
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catenated as “00153104104117340”. The encrypted
form of the attribute-name attr1 along STBE is therefore
“00153104104117340”. Concatenate the encrypted form
of the word in STEnc followed by a space. If STEnc was
initially “1, 0117126126104 ”, it gets updated as:
STEnc = “1, 0117126126104 00153104104117340 ”.
4. If the word is an attribute-value, the same is converted into
a string of numbers preceded by 000 using the ST refer-
ence for each character of the word. This string of num-
bers is then concatenated into STEnc followed by a space
and step 7 is executed.
For example, the third word of XML1 ‘value1” is an
attribute-value. This consists of six characters ‘v’, ‘a’, ‘l’,
‘u’, ‘e’ and ‘1’. The ST entries corresponding to these
characters are ‘850’, ‘153’, ‘137’, ‘820’, ‘146’ and ‘340’
respectively. These numbers get concatenated as
“000850153137820146340”. Therefore, the encrypted
form of the attribute-value value1 along STBE becomes
“000850153137820146340”. As earlier, this is concate-
nated with STEnc followed by a space. If STEnc was ini-
tially “1, 0117126126104 00153104104117340 ”, it gets
updated as:
STEnc = “1, 0117126126104 00153104104117340
000850153137820146340 ”.
5. 0 is used to represent a closing tag. Whenever a closing
tag is encountered 0 is concatenated with the string STEnc
followed by a space.
6. If the word is a variable part of the XML the same is
converted into a string of numbers using the ST reference
for each character of the word. This string of numbers is
then concatenated into STEnc followed by a space.
For example, the seventh word of XML1 “iiti” is a
variable part of the XML . This consists of four characters
‘i’, ‘i’, ‘t’ and ‘i’. The ST entries corresponding to these
characters are ‘122’, ‘122’, ‘104’ and ‘122’ respectively.
These numbers are concatenated as “122122104122”.
This string of numbers is then concatenated into STEnc
followed by a space. After completion of the encryption
of the whole XML 1, the encrypted message STEnc looks
like this:
STEnc = “1, 0117126126104 00153104104117340
000850153137820146340 00153104104117349
000850153137820146349 0116153109146
122122104122 1 0 0850153137820146 349 2 0 0”.
Since key[8] decides the size of the Symbol Table Based
Encrypted message, the range of key[8] is from 1 to an
integer depending on the network latency between the
service provider and the client.
7. This step is the TAT creation step. This step is arrived at
only for non-variable parts of the XML. The numbers cor-
responding to each character in the non-variable words are
added and stored in the variable sum. The number of digits
in the integers representing the non-variable parts of the
XML (say noOfDigitsForNonVars), should be minimum
and such that it can accommodate all non-variable parts
in it. It can be decided by the server and client separately
and automatically based on the number of non-variable
parts currently in use for communication (say noOfNon-
Vars). The following calculations are next done:
(a) noOfNonVars can be calculated as a summation of
the number of new non-variable parts introduced in
the current message and the number of entries al-
ready present in the TAT.
(b) noOfDigitsForNonVars=
dlog10 (noO f NonVars+ 1)e
Here we add 1, because noOfNonVars as a mul-
tiple of 10 gives a wrong impression about the
noOfDigitsForNonVars, if noOfDigitsForNonVars =
dlog10 (noO f NonVars)e. This is because we are us-
ing zero for indicating the type of the word, there-
fore we should not include zero in the non-variable
part of the number mapping. If noOfNonVars is 10
then dlog10 (noO f NonVars)e results in 1. This im-
plies that in such a case we need to necessarily use
all digits from 0 to 9 to map the various non-variable
parts in TAT. Adding 1 in the above formula removes
this limitation.
(c) diff = noOfDigitsForNonVars-(no. of digits in sum)
(d) sum = sum×10di f f
(e) Finally, the record (word, sum) is stored in TAT.
However if the corresponding sum is already
present in TAT then repeat: sum = (sum+1)%
10noO f DigitForNonVars until sum gets a unique value
other than 0.
For example, the tag “root” consists of four characters ‘r’,
‘o’, ‘o’, ‘t’. The ST entries corresponding to these char-
acters are ‘117’, ‘126’, ‘126’ and ‘104’ respectively. The
steps followed for the word “root” are:
(a) sum = 117 + 126 + 126 + 104 = 473.
(b) noOfNonVars = number of new non-variable parts
introduced in the current message (7) + number of
entries already present in the TAT (0) = 7.
(c) noOfDigitsForNonVars = dlog10 (7 + 1)e = 1.
(d) diff = 1-3 = -2.
(e) sum = 473×10−2 = 4.
(f) The record (root, 4) is stored in TAT, because no
other sum is present in TAT with a value of 4. If
another entry was indeed present in TAT with sum
= 4, then the entry corresponding to “root” stored
in TAT would have been (“root”, 5). The Tag Table
(TAT) is created simultaneously with STBE as shown
in Figure 10. The TAT stores the agreed upon inte-
gers corresponding to each non-variable part of the
XML.
Figure 10: Tag Table (TAT)
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There is provision that in the future new non-variable
parts be included in the conversation, and so noOfDig-
itsForNonVars may increase. Consequently the Tag Ta-
ble (TAT) would also need to be updated in future to ac-
commodate new non-variable parts. In general, a REST-
ful communication does not need more than 100 different
non-variable parts (although the same non-variable parts
may be repeated more than 100 times in a message). It is
therefore rare for noOfDigitsForNonVars to be more than
two.
Let us suppose that three new tags are introduced later in
“XML 1” as t1, t2 and t3, then the following calculations
would need to done:
(a) The tag “t1” consists of two characters ‘t’ and ‘1’
with ST mapping of ‘104’ and ‘340’ respectively.
sum = 104 + 340 = 444.
(b) noOfNonVars = number of new non-variable parts
introduced in the current message (3) + number of
entries already present in the TAT (7) = 10.
(c) noOfDigitsForNonVars = dlog10 (10 + 1)e = 2.
(d) diff = 2-3 = -1.
(e) sum = 444×10−1 = 44.
The newly updated Tag Table (TAT) is shown in Fig. 11.
Figure 11: Updated Tag Table
8. The server sends the STEnc to the client within an HTTP
response body in the form of plain-text.
3.3. Symbol Table Based Decryption (STBD) and TAT Creation
at Client Side
Prior to receiving a response to its first request, the client
does not have the Tag Table (TAT). The client receives the
STEnc as plain-text as a part of the response. The client de-
crypts the STEnc and simultaneously creates the TAT. Each
space separated sub-string of numbers in STEnc is called a
word. “(1,)”, “0117126126104”, “00153104104117340” etc.
are the various words in STEnc. There are a few global variables
as well. Global variables noOfNonVars and noOfDigitsForNon-
Vars are initially 0 and the global variable closed is initially 1.
A global string STDec is defined which is initially null, and a
global stack s is defined which is initially empty. The following
steps are next followed:
1. The first word conveys the tag number that has been en-
crypted using the receiver’s key. In our example, the
first word is (1,) which implies that the entire encryption
(STEnc) has been carried out using the client’s key. The
client can therefore decrypt the whole encryption.
2. Step-3 through step-15 are repeated from the second word
onwards in STEnc.
3. If the word starts with a 0, it implies a tag. The preceding
0 is removed from the word.
For example, to decrypt the word 0117126126104, the
preceding 0 is first removed and the word becomes
117126126104.
4. If the word starts with a 00, it implies an attribute-name.
The preceding 00 are removed from the word.
For example, to decrypt the word 00153104104117340,
the preceding 00 are first removed and the word becomes
153104104117340.
5. If the word starts with a 000, it is an attribute-value. The
preceding 000 are removed from the word.
For example, to decrypt the word
000850153137820146340, the preceding 000 are re-
moved and the word becomes 850153137820146340.
6. If the word does not start with a 0, it is a variable part of
the message.
For example, the word 122122104122 does not have a pre-
ceding 0 and hence it is a variable part of the message.
7. The remaining word is sliced into sub-strings of key[8]
characters each.
For example, the remaining word 117126126104 is sliced
into substrings of three characters each because key[8] in
this case is 3. Post slicing the client gets the following four
sub-strings: “117”, “126”, “126” and “104”.
8. The sub-strings are next converted to integers.
9. If the word is non-variable then all its integers are added
and the result is stored in a variable called sum.
For the word 117126126104, sum = 117 + 126 + 126 +
104 = 473.
10. If the word is non-variable then the following calculations
are done:
(a) noOfNonVars can be calculated as a summation of
the number of new non-variable parts introduced in
the current message and the number of entries al-
ready present in the TAT.
(b) noOfDigitsForNonVars=
dlog10 (noO f NonVars + 1)e
(c) diff = noOfDigitsForNonVars-(no. of digits in sum)
(d) sum = sum×10di f f
For example the following calculations are done for the
word 117126126104 in STEnc:
(a) noOfNonVars = number of new non-variable parts
introduced in the current message (7) + number of
entries already present in the TAT (0) = 7.
(b) noOfDigitsForNonVars = dlog10 (7 + 1)e = 1.
(c) diff = 1-3 = -2.
(d) sum = 473×10−2 = 4.
noOfDigitsForNonVars gets calculated for each word, and
gets updated when the number of non-variable words gets
increased. In general a RESTful communication does not
need more than 100 different non-variable parts (although
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same non-variable parts may be repeated more than 100
times in a message). It is rare therefore, for noOfDigits-
ForNonVars to be more than two. This type of example
was also discussed in the last sub-section.
11. The corresponding character for each number found after
slicing the word is identified in ST.
In the word 117126126104 for example, “117” belongs to
“r”, “126” belongs to “o” and “104” belongs to “t”.
12. These characters are concatenated in the same order that
the corresponding integers appeared in the encrypted
word. The concatenated string is stored in the variable
var.
For example, in the encrypted word 117126126104 the
characters “r”, “o”, “o” and “t” are concatenated to
make it “root”. var = “root”
13. If var is a non-variable part then the following is done:
(a) The record (var, sum) is stored in the TAT. However
if the corresponding sum is already present in TAT
then repeat: sum = (sum+1)% 10noO f DigitForNonVars
until the sum gets a unique value other than 0.
For example the record (root, 4) is stored in TAT, be-
cause no other sum is present in TAT with a value
of 4. If an entry was present in TAT with sum = 4,
then the entry corresponding to “root” that would be
stored in TAT would be (“root”, 5). The Tag Table
(TAT) is created simultaneously with STBD, which is
the same as the server as shown in Figure 10.
(b) If the variable var is a tag and the variable closed =
0, then STDec = STDec +>+<+var. If closed = 1
then STDec = STDec +<+var. var is pushed into the
stack s. The variable closed is updated to closed = 0.
For var = “root”, STDec = “< root”. “root” is
pushed into the stack and the variable closed is up-
dated to closed = 0.
(c) If the var is an attribute-name then
STDec = STDec+[space]+var+“=”+“‘”.
After making var = “attr1”, STDec = “<root
attr1=‘”.
(d) If the var is an attribute-value then STDec =
STDec+var+”’”.
After making var = “value1”, STDec = “<root
attr1=‘value1’”.
14. If var is a variable part then the steps below are followed:
(a) If the variable closed = 0 then STDec =
STDec+>+var. If closed = 1 then STDec =
STDec+var. The variable closed is updated to closed
= 1.
(b) Based on the data type of the decrypted variable part,
the client decides on the data type contained by its
container tag. For example the variable part “iiti”
indicates that the container tag <name> contains a
string data type.
15. If the word comprises a single character 0, a ‘pop’ oper-
ation is done on the stack s to find the innermost opened
tag. If closed = 0 then STDec = STDec+>+</+pop(s)+>.
If closed = 1 then STDec = STDec+</+pop(s)+>. Update
closed = 1.
Subsequent to working on all the words of STEnc, the client
gets STDec as:
STDec = “<root attr1=‘value1’
attr2=‘value2’><name>iiti</name><value>2</value>
</root>”.
The created TAT is the same as that of the server and is shown
in Figure 10.
3.4. Tag Table Based Encryprion (TATBE)
The TATBE exists at both the client and server sides. After
the creation of the Tag Table (TAT) both the client and server
use it to encrypt further communications. In between a con-
versation, if the server introduces a new non-variable part then
the new non-variable part gets encrypted using Symbol Table
Based Encryption (STBE) and the rest of the non-variable parts
gets encrypted using TATBE. A client never needs to introduce
a new non-variable part of the message. The variable parts of
the message always gets encrypted using STBE.
TATBE is very similar to STBE with the only difference being
that the Symbol Table (ST) is used for character-by-character
encryption of the message, and here we use the Tag Table (TAT)
to map the non-variable parts with unique numbers.
Lets assume that the encrypted message gets stored in a string
type global variable TATEnc. The initial value of TATEnc is
null. The non-variable and variable parts of the XML are con-
sidered in the same order in which they appear in the XML. The
non-variable and variable parts of the XML together consti-
tute a word. For example, in XML1 the order of occurrence of
the words is “<root>”, “attr1”, “value1”, “attr2”, “value2”,
“<name>”, ”iiti”, “</name>”, “<value>”, “2”, “</value>”
and “</root>”.
Just like STBE there is a comma separated list of tag numbers
appended at the beginning of TATEnc followed by a space. This
list of tag numbers is an indication to the receiver on which tag
and its children have been encrypted using the client’s key.
For example, the number (1,) at the beginning of TATEnc im-
plies that the receiver has access to the tag “root” and its chil-
dren in XML1 (i.e the whole document). The number (2,) at the
beginning of TATEnc implies that the receiver has access to the
tag “name” and its children in XML1. The presence of (2,3,) at
the beginning of TATEnc indicates that the receiver has access
to the tags “name” and “value” and their children in XML1.
We assume here that the whole XML has been encrypted using
the client’s key. TATEnc is updated to: TATEnc = TATEnc +
“1,”. The steps involved in the TATBE are as follows.
1. Step-2 through step-7 are repeated for each word in the
XML.
2. If the word is a tag, the TAT is searched for this word. If
the word is found in the TAT, its corresponding integer is
fetched. The fetched integer is converted into a string and
is appended with a 0. We store this string of numbers in
variable the var. TATEnc is next updated to: TATEnc =
TATEnc + [space]+var. If the tag is not available in TAT
then go to step-6.
For example, the first word of XML1 is a tag “root”. This
tag is found in TAT. The corresponding integer of the tag,
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4, is fetched from the TAT. This integer is converted to
a string and appending with a 0. var = 04. TATEnc is
updated to: TATEnc = TATEnc+[space]+“04”.
3. If the word is an attribute-name, the TAT is searched for
this word. If the word is found in the TAT, its correspond-
ing integer is fetched. The fetched integer is converted
into a string and is appended with with a 00. This string
of number is stored in the variable var. TATEnc is next
updated as: TATEnc = TATEnc + [space]+var. If the
attribute-name is not available in TAT then goto step-6.
For example, the second word of XML1 is the attribute-
name “attr1”. This attribute-name is available in TAT. The
corresponding integer of the attribute-name, 8, is fetched
from the TAT. This integer is converted to a string and ap-
pended with 00. var = 008. TATEnc is updated to: TATEnc
= TATEnc+[space]+“008”.
4. If the word is an attribute-value, the TAT is searched for
this word. If the word is found in the TAT, its correspond-
ing integer is fetched. The fetched integer is converted
into a string and is appended with a 000. This string of
numbers is referred to as var. TATEnc is next updated as:
TATEnc = TATEnc + [space]+var. If the attribute-name is
not available in TAT then goto step-6.
For example, the second word of XML1 is the attribute-
value “value1”. This attribute-name is available in TAT.
The corresponding integer of the attribute-name, 2, is
fetched from the TAT. This integer is converted to a string
and appending with 000. var = 0002. TATEnc is updated
to: TATEnc = TATEnc+[space]+“0002”.
5. 0 is used to represent the closing tag. Whenever a clos-
ing tag occurs, 0 is concatenated with the string TATEnc
separated by a space.
6. If the word constitutes the non-variable part of the XML
which is not found in TAT, the word is converted into
a string of numbers using STBE. TATEnc is updated as
TATEnc = TATEnc + [space] + result of STBE for word.
7. STBE is explored for the given variable word and TATEnc
is updated as: TATEnc = TATEnc + [space] + result of
STBE for the word.
On completion of the encryption of XML 1 the encrypted
message TATEnc looks like TATEnc = “1, 04 008 0002 009
0003 05 122122104122 0 06 349 0 0”.
As long as an entry for a word is present in TAT, the server
does not use STBE to encrypt the word. If, however, a new
non-variable part is introduced in the XML as shown in XML
2, the newly introduced non-variable part would need to be
encrypted using STBE while the rest of the non-variable parts
would be encrypted using TATBE. For the XML given in XML
2 the final encrypted message becomes: TATEnc = “1, 04 008
0002 009 0003 05 122122104122 0 06 349 0 0116850 153340
0 0”.
XML 2:
<root attr1="value1" attr2="value2">
<name>iiti</name>
<value>2</value>
<nv>a1</nv>
</root>
3.5. Tag Table Based Decryption (TATBD)
TATBD stands for TAT based decryption and this exists at
both the client and server ends. The Client gets TATEnc as
plain-text in the response whereas the server gets it within the
request body. The receiver decrypts the TATEnc. Each space
separated sub-string of numbers in the TATEnc is called a word.
(1,), 04, 008 etc. are the various words in TATEnc. We define
a global variable called closed that is initially 1, a globally de-
fined string TATDec that is initially null, and a global stack s
that is initially empty.
1. The first word indicates the tag numbers that have been en-
crypted using the receiver’s key. In our running example
the first word is (1,). This indicates that the whole encryp-
tion (TATEnc) has been done using the client’s key, and
therefore the client can decrypt the whole XML.
2. Step-3 through 12 are repeated for the second word on-
wards in TATEnc.
3. If the word starts with a 0, it implies that it is a tag. The
preceding 0 is removed from the word and it is converted
to an integer.
For example to decrypt the word 04, the preceding 0 is first
removed and it becomes 4. The same is then converted to
an integer.
4. If the word starts with 00, it implies that it is an attribute-
name. The preceding 00 is removed from the word and the
same is converted to an integer.
For example to decrypt the word 008, the preceding 00 is
first removed and it becomes 8. The same is then converted
to an integer.
5. If the word starts with 000, it implies that it is an attribute-
value. The preceding 000 is removed from the word and
the same is converted to an integer.
For example to decrypt the word 0002, the preceding 000
is removed and it becomes 2. The same is converted to an
integer.
6. If the word does not have a preceding 0, it implies that it is
the variable part of the message. The variable part of the
message gets decrypted using the STBD.
7. The non-variable words are first searched in TAT. If the
word is not found in TAT then the same is decrypted us-
ing the STBD. If, however, the word is found in the TAT
then the corresponding name is fetched and stored in the
variable var.
8. If the word is a tag and closed = 0 then TATDec = TAT-
Dec +>+<+var. If closed = 1 then TATDec = TATDec
+<+var. var is pushed into the stack s and closed is up-
dated: closed = 0.
For var = “root”, TATDec = “<root”. Word “root” is
pushed into the stack and closed is update closed = 0.
9. If the word is an attribute-name then
TATDec = TATDec+[space]+var+“=”+“‘”.
After making var = “attr1”, TATDec = “<root attr1=‘”.
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10. If the word is an attribute-value then TATDec = TAT-
Dec+var+“’”.
After making var = “value1”, TATDec = “<root
attr1=‘value1’”.
11. If the word is a variable part of the XML and closed = 0
then TATDec = TATDec+>+var. If closed = 1 then TAT-
Dec = TATDec+var. Variable closed is update to closed =
1.
12. If a single character 0 is found as a word then a pop opera-
tion is done on the stack s to find innermost opened tag. If
closed = 0 then TATDec = TATDec+>+</+pop(s)+>. If
closed = 1 then TATDec = TATDec+</+pop(s)+>. closed
is updated: closed = 1.
Subsequent to working on all the words of TATEnc the client
gets TATDec as “<root attr1=“value1”
attr2=“value2”><name>iiti</name><value>2
</value></root>”.
3.6. Communication in web service Composition Scenario
In a web service composition scenario, there is multiple ser-
vice providers that work on the same message but need to have
access to only some parts of the message. To realize this, the
proposed approach encrypts different parts of the message with
different keys. Lets consider a scenario where there is one main
server (Service Provider) S and two other service providers SP1
and SP2. They commonly agree on a key called group key.
A client C sends a request to the main server S. S needs to
reply to the request with XML 2. In putting together the reply,
S requires the services of SP1 and SP2. SP1 is required to up-
date the value between the <name> tag and SP2 is required to
update the values between the <value> and <nv> tags. SP1 and
SP2 must not be able to access or update any other tags that do
not belong to them. In this situation, there are three symmetric
keys in use. The first one is the key between S and SP1 (say
K1), the second one is the key between S and SP2 (say K2) and
the third one is the agreed upon group key between all S, SP1
and SP2 (Say K3). The common tags of the XML will be en-
crypted using the group key K3. Tags that are only supposed
to be updated by S and SP1 must be encrypted using K1 and
tags that are only supposed to be updated by S and SP2 must be
encrypted using K2.
The first word of the encrypted message tells SP1 and SP2
about one or more tag numbers separated by a comma that
they are supposed to process. If secret key of SP1-S is [12,
6, 1, 1, 1, 14, 4, 1, 3, 2], secret key of SP2-S is [6, 12, 1, 0,
1, 14, 3, 1, 3, 2] and group key is [7, 10, 0, 0, 1, 14, 3, 0, 3,
2]. SP1 is supposed to process the second tag i.e name and
its child. SP2 is supposed to process the third and fourth tags
i.e value and nv and their children. TAT based Message from
S to SP1 is: “2, 01 009 0002 003 0004 05 122122104122
0 07 313 0 08 356290 0 0”. ST based Message from
S to SP1 is: “2, 0232325325180 00137180180232257
000136137126157314257 00137180180232226
000136137126157314226 0116153109146 122122104122
0 0291356265326320 313 0 0410291 356290 0 0”. TAT based
Message from S to SP2 is: “3,4, 01 009 0002 003 0004 05
122122104122 0 07 313 0 08 356290 0 0”. ST based Message
from S to SP2 is: “3,4, 0232325325180 00137180180232257
000136137126157314257 00137180180232226
000136137126157314226 0116153109146 122122104122 0
0291356265326320 313 0 0410291 356265 0 0”.
This web service composition scenario is just an example.
Various other compositions are also possible.
3.7. Message Authentication in Web Service Composition
Message authentication is a compulsory step in any conver-
sation where there is a possibility of updates by others in the
middle because encrypted message can also be changed. For
message authentication, we use existing algorithms like MD5,
SHA1 etc. To exemplify this, we know from the earlier example
that the tag that belongs to S and SP1 is <name>. As both S and
SP1 want a confirmation that tag <name> which is the second
tag is not changed by an intermediary. Therefore, to achieve
message authentication after encrypting the tag <name>, the
sender (S) prefixes K1 to the encrypted tag and creates a hash
(say MD5) of it . The overall hash is attached at the end of the
corresponding tag.
The sequence of steps followed by the sender (S) and receiver
(SP1) is:
1. Sender encrypts the message using TATBE as above.
2. The TAT based encryption of the <name> tag is “05
122122104122 0”. This is appended with the private key
K1 by the sender as
“[12,6,1,1,1,14,4,1,3,2]05 122122104122 0”.
3. The sender calculates the MD5 of
“[12,6,1,1,1,14,4,1,3,2]05 122122104122 0” as
“adc1aeffe1fe867740f976fd55c0c481” (say D1).
4. The TAT based encryption of the <root> tag is “01 009
0002 003 0004 05 122122104122 0 07 313 0 08 356290
0 0”. This is appended with the group key K3 by the
sender as “[7,10,0,0,1,14,3,0,3,2]01 009 0002 003 0004
05 122122104122 0 07 313 0 08 356290 0 0”.
5. The sender (S) calculates the MD5 of
“[7,10,0,0,1,14,3,0,3,2]01 009 0002 003 0004 05
122122104122 0 07 313 0 08 356290 0 0” as
“72afa9838090da9c5d82d2060c42f48c” (say D2).
6. Before sending the reply the sender appends these digests
just after closing the corresponding tag for which digests
have been calculated. D1 is appended after closing the sec-
ond tag and D2 is appended after closing of the “<root>”
tag.
7. The sender sends the message: “2, 01 009 0002 003 0004
05 122122104122 0 D1 07 313 0 08 356290 0 0 D2”.
There is no need to authenticate the third and fourth tags
because these do not belong to SP1.
8. The first word “(2,)” conveys to the receiver that it has to
work on the second tag. It is known to all that the first
tag “<root>” is encrypted using a group key, as this tag
contains all other tags.
9. The variable part at the end of a tag that contains alpha-
betic characters is the message digest of the corresponding
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tag. For example, D1 is present just after closing the sec-
ond tag, which is why the receiver considers it as a digest
of the second tag and its children. Similarly, D2 is the di-
gest of the first tag (“<root>”) and its children. Although
the whole “<root>” tag and its children are not encrypted
using the client’s key, the overall digest D2 is created by
appending the K3.
10. The receiver takes out the second word of the encrypted
message and D1, and further calculates its digest in the
same way as the sender did in step-3 using K1. If the di-
gest calculated by the receiver is the same as D1 then the
message is authentic. If they are not the same, the message
will be rejected.
11. The receiver calculates the digest of the whole message
that the sender did it in step-5 using K3. If the digest cal-
culated by the Receiver is the same as D2 then the message
is authentic. If they are not same, the message will be re-
jected.
A Similar process is followed to authenticate the Symbol Ta-
ble Based Encryption. In case of communication between S and
SP2 the sender will use K2 instead of K1. The message from S
to SP2 is: “2, 01 009 0002 003 0004 05 122122104122
0 07 313 0 5f4ffdd89acc919420ac885e6017bcfc 08
356290 0 44e9e15af5f4289bab86c90e0d9398d1 0
72afa9838090da9c5d82d2060c42f48c”.
3.8. Working With JSON Data
JSON has a different structure from XML but both are inter-
changeable with each other. We can easily convert XML 1 to
JSON 1 as shown.
We treat JSON names, values of a JSON name that start with
a ‘-’ as non-variable words and double quoted JSON names as
variable words. An array in JSON is considered a repetition of
a tag and the values in between them are consecutive elements
of an array. Closing the curly bracket denotes the end of the
innermost open tag.
As XML and JSON are equivalent, their encryption as string
of numbers must also be the same.
4. Advantage of the proposed approach
Here we present the salient feature of the proposed technique
highlighting its strength as compared to existing techniques.
4.1. Need for XML canonicalization is eliminated
As mentioned earlier, canonicalization converts logically
equivalent XML documents to ones with identical physical
structures. We require XML canonicalization if we encrypt an
XML or part of the XML byte-by-byte. Formal security tech-
niques provided by w3c and OASIS for SOAP based web ser-
vices [3] need XML canonicalization. But since our encryption
technique is a text based substitution (Character to number), we
do not need XML canonicalization.
4.2. Need for content negotiation is eliminated
As the encryption of XML and JSON that represent the same
data results in identical messages in the proposed approach.
The message may also be decrypted to any of the two forms.
The approach therefore seamlessly works with both XML and
JSON contents.
4.3. No need to send extra HTTP headers
We do not send any extra HTTP headers as in the case of
Serme, G. et. al [11]. In our case the agreement on a key be-
tween a service provider and its client results in a compromise
of statelessness of RESTful web services to a very small extent.
4.4. Resource representation in encrypted form
In the dynamic web services composition where a service
provider may enter or leave the group randomly, the resource
itself becomes a sensitive document. Putting the resource rep-
resentation in the public domain is not good for such a sce-
nario. As already discussed in our approach, the client requests
a resource whose representation is not known to it with a GET
method and the encrypted resource is transferred using Sym-
bol Table Based Encryption (STBE). If the client uses an empty
POST or PUT the request the server explicitly sends the en-
crypted resource representation to the client using STBE.
4.5. Suitable for RESTful web services composition
The proposed approach facilitates different parts of the same
message to be encrypted with different keys. The various inter-
mediaries are notified about the tag number on which they have
to work. An intermediary therefore does not get any sense of
others’ data. If an intermediary does try to change others’ data,
the receiver will simply reject it because of message authenti-
cation.
4.6. Size of encrypted message
The size of an HTTP message should be as small as possible
in RESTful communication. The encrypted message created
using this approach is much smaller in size than that of other ex-
isting algorithms. Further, if the number of non-variable char-
acters is larger than the number of variable characters, the size
of the encrypted message is even smaller than the size of the
actual message itself. However if the number of variable char-
acters dominates over the number of non-variable (which is rel-
atively rare) characters the size of the encrypted message using
our approach may sometimes become larger than that of exist-
ing approaches. In this case the size of the encrypted message
largely depends on key[8]. Table 1 describes the size compari-
son of encrypted messages using various encryption algorithms
on various types of XML data. Here we do encryption on the
whole XML, not on a given part of the XML. The key used for
STBE and TATBE is [12,6,1,1,1,14,4,1,3,2]. Here we include
various characters like <, >, /, “,= etc used for the non-variable
parts in the count of the number of characters used in the non-
variable parts.
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Table 1: Size comparison of various encryption techniques on various XML
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 Column 9 Column 10
12 12 161 6 101 318 473 441 565 376
18 45 637 24 404 1209 1665 1625 2185 1480
22 89 1235 48 808 2397 3245 3213 4345 2938
18 45 627 24 627 1432 1965 1921 2845 2140
8 27694 341167 27644 64961 433776 615258 578380 637558 360770
1 1 39 1 1 41 64 40 59 9
3 3 12 1 12 26 89 57 57 51
1 1 7 1 17 25 32 40 59 57
Column1 represents the number of unique {non-variable} parts of the document.
Column2 represents the number of {non-variable} parts used in the document.
Column3 represents the number of characters in the {non-variable} parts.
Column4 represents the number of {variable} parts.
Column5 represents the number of characters in the {variable} parts.
Column6 represents the total number of characters in the XML (Including new line characters and a few space characters).
Column7 represents the number of characters in AES (Rijndael 256) encryption.
Column8 represents the number of characters in 3DES encryption.
Column9 represents the number of characters in STBE encryption.
Column10 represents Number of characters in TATBE encryption.
4.7. Hard to attack
This is especially true in the condition that a service provider
within the group is the attacker. This, in fact, makes this ap-
proach especially useful. The following points make this en-
cryption hard to attack:
1. The 10-element key is generated randomly and sent to the
other party using TLS. It is therefore not possible for other
service providers to sniff the key.
2. A brute force attack is not possible. This is so because
first, it is very hard to go through all possible values for
all ten elements, and then to create various tables for all
possibilities, and further to decrypt a part of the XML that
does not belong to the attacker with all possible keys. Even
if the attacker manages the above, it will not be sure which
one is the correct decryption.
3. Message authentication prevents an attacker from chang-
ing the unauthorized part of the XML through hit and trial.
4. The Known plain-text attack [12] is the most dangerous
for this approach. This attack is possible if the attacker
has a valid plain-text/cipher-text pair. Using this, the at-
tacker can try to guess the further encrypted message or
even the key. If somehow the attacker is able to map be-
tween the various characters and the number or the tag-
name and the number, then all of the encryption will be
compromised. The question here is how will the attacker
get a valid cipher-text/plain-text pair in a web service com-
position scenario.
5. The chosen plain-text attack [13] is a attack that presumes
that the attacker can get a cipher-text for any random plain-
text and can try to guess the further conversation or the key
itself. In case of web service composition the attacker is
a service provider and would have a different shared key,
and therefore it can not possibly get an encrypted message
with other’s key.
6. Various security aspects on RESTful web services are de-
scribed by OWASP [14]. Here we are dealing with only
the message level security. In our approach XML and
JSON input validation and message integrity are provided
through message authentication of the XML or JSON doc-
ument.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel approach for message
level security in RESTful web services. This approach is a
kind of substitution cipher which replaces different characters
by a unique integer. Various tag-names, arguments and values
of arguments were also replaced by corresponding unique inte-
gers. Substitution from character to number removes the need
for XML canonicalization. This approach removes the need
for content negotiation for the same resource among service
providers and clients, and also reduces the size of the overall
encrypted message. We applied this approach on several XML
and JSON data and found that for most of the cases our ap-
proach resultd in smaller sized encrypted messages than those
of existing approaches. We also demonstrated the efficiency of
the proposed message in web services composition scenarios
through encrypting different tags with different keys, and also
maintained message authentication. The discussed algorithms
were implemented in JAVA.
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